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NOTES
reached since the determination of the lawfulness of the restraint
is much the same in civil, as in common law.
THEODORE C. STRICKLAND
SALES-EFFECT OF RECORDATION ON COMMUNITY RIGHTS
Leaving his wife at the marital domicile in Mississippi, Isiah
Payne came to Louisiana. He purchased immovable property in
Bossier Parish, reciting his marital status as single in the recorded
act of sale. A divorce was subsequently obtained by the husband
in Bossier Parish by substituted service without his wife's knowl-
edge; the judgment was not recorded in the conveyance records
of the parish. Defendant then bought the property from the hus-
band and again the recorded sale stated that the husband was a
single man. Plaintiff, aware of the husband's true marital status,
went to Mississippi and bought the wife's undivided one-half
interest in the property. He then immediately brought a petitory
action, seeking to be adjudicated owner of a one-half interest in
the property. Held, under Article 2266 of the Civil Code1 the
-unrecorded divorce judgment affecting the immovable property
in controversy was utterly null and void as to the defendant, a
third party relying on the public records. Humphreys v. Royal,
215 La. 567, 41 So. 2d 220 (1949).
Article 2266 is the codal basis for what has come to be known
as the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker: third parties who engage
in transactions that involve immovable property are entitled to
rely upon the public records, even if they have actual notice of
unrecorded claims against the property.2 Behind this established
doctrine stands the public policy of protecting the security of real
estate transactions.
The doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker has at various times come
into conflict with other settled rules of law. Among these are the
1. "All sales, contracts and judgments affecting immovable property,
which shall not be so recorded, shall be utterly null and void, except between
the parties thereto. The recording may be made at any time, but shall only
affect third persons from the time of the recording.
"The recording shall have effect from the time when the act is deposited
in the proper office, and indorsed by the proper officer." Art 2266, La. Civil
Code of 1870. See also Arts. 2262, 2264, 2265, La. Civil Code of 1870.
2. McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909), doctrine discussed in:
Coyle v. Allen, 168 La. 504, 509, 122 So. 596, 598 (1929); Westwego Canal and
Terminal Co., Inc. v. Pizanie, 174 La. 1068, 1071, 142 So. 691, 692 (1932); State
ex rel. Hebert v. Recorder of Mortgages, 175 La. 94, 143 So. 15 (1932); Masters
v. Cleveland, 158 So. 382, 385 (La. App. 1935); Gulf Refining Co. v. Evans,
181 So. 666, 670 (La. App. 1938). See also Notes, 14 Tulane L. Rev. 16 (1939),
22 Tulane L. Rev. 208 (1947), 23 Tulane L. Rev. 259 (1949).
19511
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
rules of forced heirship and community property. In the first of
three cases involving the rights of forced heirs, Long v. Chailan,3
it was held that this doctrine did not defeat the right of forced
heirs who inherited their mother's half of community property,
even though there was no positive information of record as to
their inheritance rights. Further, there was no information of
record, reliance upon which might negate such a claim. In a case
arising two years later, Chachere v. Superior Oil Company,4 the
court applied the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker. The decision is
sometimes considered contrary to Long v. Chailan, but in fact
in the later case there was positive information of record on which
third persons had relied. In the latest case, Thompson v. Thomp-
son,5 the court allowed forced heirs to set aside their ancestor's
simulated sale to the detriment of a third party, who had pur-
chased an option in reliance on the public records. The court
indicated, however, that its decision would not be applicable to
a case where the rights of the third party arose from a completed
sale instead of an option to purchase. Thus, the court has not
established and maintained a consistent policy which would be
applicable to all cases involving a, conflict between the rules of
forced heirship and those of recordation.
In Succession of James,6 the court faced the issue of whether
the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker should be given priority over
the rules relating to community property. There the wife bought
and later mortgaged certain real estate by recorded acts in which
her marital status was described as single. After the wife's death,
the mortgagee had the property sold to satisfy the mortgage. The
husband, a sailor, returned in time to contest the mortgagee's
right to the entire proceeds on the ground that the property was
acquired during the marriage and hence that he was entitled to
the surviving spouse's one-half interest.7 The court held for the
husband, considering settled8 that the protection of the right of
3. 187 La. 507, 175 So. 42 (1937).
4. 192 La. 193, 187 So. 321 (1939), noted in 2 LOUISIANA LAw REVIEW 387
(1940). See also Note, 23 Tulane L. Rev. 259 (1949).
5. 211 La. 468, 30 So. 2d 321 (1947), noted in 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 429
(1948), 22 Tulane L. Rev. 208 (1947).
6. 147 La. 944, 86 So. 403 (1920).
7. Arts. 2402, 2405, 2406, La. Civil Code of 1870; Giglio v. Giglio, 159 La.
46, 105 So. 95 (1925); Washington v. Palmer, 28 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1946).
Daggett, The Community Property System in Louisiana, 8-17 (1945).
8. 147 La. 945, 950, 86 So. 403, 405 (1920). In Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La.
813, 826, 107 So. 584, 586 (1926), it was said: "It had been decided, in Dixon v.
Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188, 23 Am. Dec. 478, in 1832, and was repeated in
Theall v. Theall, 7 La. 226, 26 Am. Dec. 501, in 1834, that the wife had not a
mere expectancy but the absolute ownership of half of the community prop-
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a surviving spouse to an undivided one-half interest in the com-
munity property operates as an exception to the rule that third
parties may safely rely on the public records.
In the present case the court was careful to distinguish Suc-
cession of James. It pointed out that there was no contract or
judgment affecting the immovable that could be recorded in that
case, while here there was a divorce obtained by the husband
which could have been but was not recorded. From this the
court concluded that Article 2266 was applicable in the instant,
case although not in Succession of James. This distinction is open
to question. In general, property acquired by either spouse during
marriage belongs to the community of acquets and gains.9 To
determine whether the parties were married at a given time, the
marriage certificate is as important as the divorce judgment. A
recorded marriage certificate is notice that property thereafter
acquired may be community property, 10 but a recorded divorce
judgment is not necessarily notice to third parties that previously
acquired property belongs to the community, for the marriage
may have occurred subsequent to the acquisition. Therefore, if
the vendee in the present case was not affected by the unrecorded
divorce, then it would seem that the mortgagee in the James case
should not have been affected by the unrecorded marriage cer-
tificate.
If the doctrine of McDuffle v. Walker has priority over com-
munity rights, the court could have simply said as much, without
reference to thd divorce judgment. By basing its decision on the
ground that the defendant was not affected by the unrecorded
divorce judgment, and by thus distinguishing the instant case
from Succession of James, the court apparently was unwilling to
hold that the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker has priority every
time it conflicts with community rights. The equities in the case
may have influenced the court to find for the defendant, and in
doing so, to base its decision on the narrow ground just referred
to. It is apparent from the opinion that the court viewed the
erty during the existence of the community, subject, of course, to the hus-
band's power of administration." This was affirmed in Succession of Weiner,
20:3 La. 649, 14 So. 2d 475 (1943). Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Evans, 181 So. 666
(La. App. 1938).
9. Art. 2402, La. Civil Code of 1870. See also note 8, supra.
10. While marriage is not recognized as a contract, Rhodes v. Miller, 189
La. 288, 179 So. 430 (1938), it partakes to some extent of that status. Arts. 86,
90, La. Civil Code of 1870. If the property is community, divorce calls for
dissolution, but it is marital status that establishes the nature of the property
acquired as community or separate.
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plaintiff as an opportunist who, knowing the true circumstances,
bought the wife's interest in the property solely as a speculation."
As between plaintiff and the innocent vendee, who had bought
the property in reliance on the records, the equities obviously
favor the vendee. But a contrary result might obtain under a
different factual situation. If the wife had been plaintiff the
court might have been impressed with the fact that she could
hardly have recorded a divorce judgment when she had no knowl-
edge of the divorce suit.
The court's narrow holding may be founded on the desire
not to commit itself to a definite policy at this time. Litigation
involving this issue has arisen only infrequently, 12 and the court
may be as yet undecided on the preference to be established
between the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker and the right of a
spouse in the community at termination of the marriage.
As a result of the narrow basis on which the present decision
rests, it is impossible to say definitely that the case represents a
policy determination. If the decision was based primarily upon
the facts of the case and was not dictated by policy consideration,
it would appear that protection of the divorced spouse's rights in
the community property will require the divorce to be recorded
in the parish conveyance records.' 8 Unless the spouse knows in
which parish or parishes the immovables are located, adequate
protection will require recordation of the divorce judgment in
all sixty-four parishes of the state. The question arises whether
marriage certificates also should be recorded in the conveyance
records of all sixty-four parishes to protect the rights of the spouse
in the community property.
If the decision is based strictly on the failure to record the
divorce judgment, to what extent may a title examiner rely
on a statement of marital status appearing in the public records?
For example, suppose the title examiner finds in the recorded
sale by which the vendor acquired the property a recitation that
the vendor was divorced, whereas in fact the vendor was then
11. "Soon after the development of the Benton Oil Field, in which area
this property lies, the plaintiff, obviously with a knowledge of all of the facts,
sought out Gertrude Fields Payne at her residence in Mississippi, and, on
April 26, 1946, purchased from her an undivided half interest . . . in and to
the property." 215 La. 567, 576, 41 So. 2d 220, 221 (1949).
12. Until the present case, the issue had arisen but once, in Johnson v.
Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 1102, 36 So. 2d 396, 399 (1948), in the thirty years since
Succession of James, and then only indirectly.
13. On the death of a parent, will forced heirs now be required to record




married but has subsequently been divorced? Could the exam-
iner advise the prospective vendee to rely on the recorded state-
ment of divorce? Assuming that policy does not underlie the pres-
ent decision, these and similar questions will arise to plague title
examiners in the future. In addition, if the equities of this case
influenced the court's decision, the outcome of similar future
cases may depend on their individual equities.
On the other hand, the decision in the instant case may in
fact be one of policy. Failure to record the divorce judgment
might well have been merely a convenient peg on which to hang
a policy favoring the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker over the
protection of community property rights. This view of the major-
ity opinion was taken by Justice Hawthorne in his dissenting
opinion, 14 which was based on the policy announced in Succession
of James, that the community interest is paramount to, and should
prevail against, the rules of recordation. If the present decision
is considered to enunciate a policy favoring the doctrine of Mc-
Duffie v. Walker over community property rights, third parties
may now safely rely on a statement of marital status appearing
on the public records. At least one highly beneficial result be-
comes apparent immediately. Title examination is made more
certain, and considerably easier, if the examiner does not have
to inquire into the truth of the statement of marital status appear-
ing in the records. While on the surface this might appear to
open the door for fraud, 5 or to be inequitable toward the affected
spouse, these results do not necessarily follow. The issue is not
one between supporting a fraud and diminishing its occurrence,
but rather one drawn solely between the injured spouse and the
innocent third party. It presupposes misrepresentations of mari-
tal status on the public records and presents for decision the ques-
tion of whose rights in the contested property shall be protected
and who shall be relegated to a personal action against the offend-
ing spouse.'6 It cannot be said that the preference accorded the
third party by this policy is an inducement to fraud, for in either
case an innocent party stands to be shorn of his rights in the
property by an antecedent fraud. Nor is it inequitable that the
wife should be the one who must resort to a personal action
against the errant husband. As between an innocent vendee, who
14. 215 La. 567, 574-577, 41 So. 2d 220, 222-223 (1949).
15. See Note, 24 Tulane L. Rev. 375, 378 (1950), where this view is treated.
16. The wife derives her personal action from Art. 2404, La. Civil Code of
1870. The vendee derives his action from the articles on warranty, Arts. 2475,
2476, 2500, 2501, 2505, 2506, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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presumably is a stranger with no knowledge of the vendor's char-
acter, and the wife, a policy protecting the third party appears
equitably justified. But if the vendee has knowledge of the mari-
tal status of the husband and chooses to rely solely on statements
recorded in the sale, the equities might favor the wife, for in
such a case the vendee is not, in fact, "innocent."
It is impossible to say definitely that the Royal decision
favors the rules of recordation over those protecting community
rights, or that the decision is based solely on its peculiar facts
and equities. For this reason, the case creates uncertainty in an
area of law which had heretofore appeared certain, 7 and which
should be certain. A definite statement of policy is clearly needed
concerning the extent to which the doctrine of McDuffie v. Walker
has priority over the rights of the community of acquets and
gains. This uncertainty in the law is a proper subject for the
forthcoming revision of the Civil Code. It might have been desir-
able for the court to announce a clearer interim policy.
WADE V. SMITH
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS-STATUTE SETTING MINIMUM MARK UP
HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE OF FAILURE TO
CARRY OUT LEGISLATIVE POLICY
Louisiana Act 360 of 19481 provided for wholesale minimum
mark ups above cost of 15 per cent on liquor, 20 per cent on
cordial liqueurs and specialties, and 25 per cent on sparkling
and still wines; and for retail mark ups of 33% per cent on liquor,
45 per cent on cordials, liqueurs and specialties, and 50 per cent
on sparkling and still wines. Schwegmann Brothers failed to
comply with these requirements, and on revocation of their license
instituted suit to enjoin enforcement of the act, alleging denial
of due process. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed an order
granting the injunction: ". . . the provisions of Act 360 of 1948
which relate to the mandatory minimum mark ups (Sections
1 [s], 24 and 26) do not tend in a degree that is perceptible and
clear, toward the accomplishment of the announced purpose of
the statute, namely, the regulation and control of the liquor
traffic so that it 'may not cause injury to the economic, social
17. The policy stated in Succession of James had been applied as early
as Dixon v. Dixon's Executors, 4 La. 188, 23 Am. Dec. 478 (1832), nearly a hun-
dred years before. Since the James case, its decision was cited with approval
in Johnson v. Johnson, 213 La. 1092, 1101, 36 So. 2d 396, 399 (1948).
1. La. R.S. (1950) 26:1 et seq.
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